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Abstract
Background: ‘Dual practice’, or multiple job holding, generally involves public sector-based health workers taking
additional work in the private sector. This form of the practice is purported to help retain public health care workers
in low and middle-income countries’ public sectors through additional wage incentives. There has been little
conceptual or empirical development of the relationship between dual practice and retention.
Methods: This article helps begin to fill this gap, drawing on empirical evidence from a qualitative study focusing
on South African specialists. Fifty-one repeat, in-depth interviews were carried out with 28 doctors (predominantly
specialists) with more than one job, in one public and one private urban hospital.
Results: Findings suggest dual practice can impact both positively and negatively on specialists’ intention to stay in the
public sector. This is through multiple conceptual channels including those previously identified in the literature such as
dual practice acting as a ‘stepping stone’ to private practice by reducing migration costs. Dual practice can also lead
specialists to re-evaluate how they compare public and private jobs, and to overworking which can expedite decisions on
whether to stay in the public sector or leave. Numerous respondents undertook dual practice without official permission.
Conclusions: The idea that dual practice helps retain public specialists in South Africa may be overstated. Yet banning the
practice may be ineffective, given many undertake it without permission in any case. Regulation should be better enforced
to ensure dual practice is not abused. The conceptual framework developed in this article could form a basis for further
qualitative and quantitative inquiry.
Keywords: Multiple job holding, Public private mix, Retention, Migration, Loyalty, Health worker distribution
Background
‘Dual practice’ refers to health workers holding multiple
jobs of various kinds [1-3]. This article, however, along
with others in the dual practice literature [4,5], focuses
only on dual practice in the form of public-based health
workers working part-time in the private, for-profit sec-
tor, either within the same facility or outside of it
(termed ‘public on private’ dual practice by Ferrinho and
colleagues [2]).
Little is known about this practice, despite its common-
ality in many countries [6]. There is a substantial lack of
evidence on the impacts of dual practice, especially in
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). This is prob-
lematic given there may be benefits to dual practice which
regulation might encourage, and costs which regulation
might curtail [7,8]. The only real consensus in the litera-
ture so far is that dual practice carries both costs and ben-
efits, and that more research is needed to understand
these costs and benefits in specific contexts. It is also uni-
versally noted that, in terms of regulation, dual practice is
difficult to ban [4,9,10].
One important set of impacts demanding further atten-
tion can be termed ‘retention impacts’. These refer to how
dual practice affects the likelihood of health workers stay-
ing in the public sector, as opposed to moving into private
practice or even leaving their countries.
Much of the scant literature in this area asserts that
LMIC health workers are more likely to stay in the public
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sector as a result of dual practice, since it is often under-
taken as a ‘coping’ or income-generating strategy. Health
workers’ income expectations often go unmet in LMIC
public sectors alone [11-13]. This argument provides a ra-
tionale for allowing dual practice, to bolster health worker
capacities in the public sector where they are most
needed. As Bir and Eggleston [14] put it, ‘since skilled cli-
nicians expect to be able to generate significant income
from private practice, allowing dual practice may be one
of the most effective policies that a cash-strapped low-
income government can use to retain skilled physicians in
public clinics and hospitals'.
Conversely, Chikanda [15] speculates that dual practice
may act as a ‘stepping stone’ to leaving the public sector,
in that health workers could use additional private income
to cover public-to-private or international migration costs.
Others have shown dual practice to be associated with
some absenteeism from the public sector [12,14]. All this
implies dual practice may exacerbate inequities in health
worker distribution, internationally and within LMICs.
There is very scarce conceptual development in terms
of channels of influence between dual practice and re-
tention. This article aims to help fill this gap by unpack-
ing the retention impacts of dual practice in a specific
LMIC setting where the practice is very common.
Qualitative evidence is presented from South Africa, a
highly unequal middle-income country where retaining
public health workers is an explicit priority of the Na-
tional Department of Health [16]. This priority results
from the country’s inequitable ‘two tier’ health system,
divided along public-private lines [17]. Around half of
all GPs and specialists, and 30% of nurses, work in the
private sector [18], serving the richest 15% of the popu-
lation with health insurance [19]. Those without health
insurance have acute health care needs. Household data
estimates the poorest 80% of the population carries
around 94% of the HIV burden, and 100% of the tuber-
culosis (TB) burden [20], for example. In combination,
HIV and TB constitute the largest disease burden in
South Africa [21].
South Africa was also an appropriate study location
since public health workers have been permitted to work
part-time in the private sector since the early 1990s, ini-
tially through the Limited Private Practice policy and,
since 2001, through the policy of ‘RWOPS’ (Remuner-
ated Work Outside the Public Service). Limited Private
Practice was introduced to help retain public health
workers [22,23], yet there is no evidence to suggest this
was effective (or ineffective). Concerns have subse-
quently been raised about RWOPS, in terms of greater
absenteeism resulting from diversion of public time to
private activities [24]. This paper is limited only to issues
of retention of health workers, however, rather than
other impacts such as absenteeism.
The study undertaken for this paper focused on doctors,
and in particular, specialists. This is since doctors appear
most likely, in any setting, to undertake dual practice out
of all health workers [2,6]. In South Africa, dual practice
has also previously been asserted as particularly common
among specialists [25].
The article now outlines the initial organization theory
framing of the study before proceeding. A conceptual
framework is developed later after empirical evidence is
presented. The conceptual framework development in this
article provides additional insights to the previous Ashmore
[26] paper which focused only on job satisfaction compari-
sons between public and private sectors. This is since, un-
like the previous paper, this article specifically addresses
one set of impacts of dual practice itself, rather than a gen-
eral comparison of public and private sectors. It also goes
considerably beyond the conceptual framing of ‘job satis-
faction’ as a predictor of retention to evaluate other inter-
mediary predictors in the context of dual practice. The
paper could be considered an intermediary study within
health policy and systems research, in terms of incremen-
tally drawing on both empirical and conceptual evidence
for the purposes of bolstering future studies.
Conceptual framing
Organization theory, the theoretical base of this paper,
draws on fields as wide as psychology, sociology and an-
thropology, as well as various theories of economics, to
explain organizational functioning and behaviour [27]. In
organization theory, the concepts of ‘motivation’, ‘job sat-
isfaction’ and ‘loyalty’ are commonly used to understand a
variety of workplace decisions. Motivation, adopted by
some researchers in the health systems literature [28,29],
refers to an, 'individual’s degree of willingness to exert and
maintain an effort towards organizational goals' [30]. Mo-
tivation is an aspirational, goal-oriented concept.
The concept of job satisfaction has also been practic-
ally applied elsewhere in the health systems literature
[31,32]. Locke [33] defines job satisfaction as 'a pleasur-
able or positive emotional state resulting from the ap-
praisal of one’s job or job experiences'. Job satisfaction
factors are noted by Spector’s [34] review of the litera-
ture to commonly fall into the following four groupings:
1) financial rewards, such as income and benefits; 2)
organizational context, including resource availability; 3)
other people, including satisfaction with patients and
colleagues; and 4) the nature of the work itself, such as
how mentally stimulating the work is and whether it is
varied or monotonous. Both job satisfaction and motiv-
ation can have similar determinants, relating to the ful-
filment of needs, values and expectations, but job
satisfaction is more empirically and conceptually related
to retention whereas motivation is more performance-
related [29,32,35].
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Ashmore [26] previously used Spector’s [34] cate-
gorization of the concept of job satisfaction to expand
upon reasons for South African specialists choosing to
work in the public versus private sector and often both.
The present article similarly takes job satisfaction as a
conceptual starting point and useful way to understand
the way dual practice affects intention to stay in the
public sector. This is since, here, ‘job satisfaction’ is as-
sumed to increase through dual practice, through the
provision of additional incentives available in private
health sector work. Jobs can, in this light, be seen as
complementary rather than substitutable. This, in turn,
is assumed to increase intention to stay in the public
sector in much the same way as intention to stay would
increase through higher ‘utility’ in economic theory.
Previous studies have found strong and significant cor-
relations between job satisfaction, intention to stay and
actual retention behaviour [36].
The concept of ‘organizational loyalty’, meanwhile, is
herein defined as commitment to a workplace, the people
in the workplace, and/or the work itself [33]. It is assumed
to mediate or control incentives to leave the public sector.
Loyalty has been found to affect retention where job satis-
faction is already low (see meta-analyses [36,37]). One
would also expect loyalty to mediate any incentives to use
dual practice as a 'stepping stone' into the private sector,
since it is understood in the literature as a retention-
enhancing concept in general.
Importantly, however, job satisfaction and loyalty are
but two parts of a more complex staying/leaving decision
process [33,34]. Mobley [38] expanded upon this through
his review of the organizational literature. They con-
structed a model where an employee’s evaluation of their
job, based around their expectations and values being (un)
met, leads them to be (dis)satisfied. Mobley stressed that
workers then evaluate the costs and benefits of quitting,
search for and compare alternative job options, and only
then decide to stay or leave. There is also the possibility
that workers act ‘impulsively’ about retention decisions.
These latter steps in the causative model, impulsive or
not, occur after the variable ‘intention to stay’. Intention
to stay is the most proximate predictor of retention this
paper deals with, since retention itself could not be ob-
served during research due to the cross-sectional and self-
reported nature of the qualitative study.
It is important to emphasize that the above concepts, later
used to understand the relationship between dual practice
and retention in a specific empiric setting, assume that both
financial and non-financial incentives affect retention. This
is since there is evidence in the literature to suggest dual
practice may be satisfying by providing non-financial, in
addition to financial, incentives. Humphrey and Russell’s
[39] qualitative study found UK specialists valued additional
jobs for ‘greater strategic influence and clinical autonomy, a
greater sense of being valued, and more opportunities to
realize … individual aspirations as clinicians’. Reasons for
dual practice mentioned by a variety of New Zealand health
workers, meanwhile, often centred around increased ‘var-
iety’, ‘enjoyment’ , and ‘challenge’ of additional work, rather
than just money [40].
Methods
In-depth, conversational interviews were conducted in
an anonymous South African city and were helpful to
derive conceptual channels of influence between dual
practice and retention. Interviews were conducted in
two field sites: one large public academic hospital, and
one large private hospital - located close to one another.
Hospitals were anonymized as ‘H1’ and ‘P1’, respectively,
to protect respondents’ identities. Twenty-three semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key infor-
mants in the same city as the hospitals, for background,
including doctors who did not undertake dual practice,
hospital managers and provincial policy-makers. Key in-
formants were asked their views on dual practice, what
forms it generally takes, and also acted as gatekeepers.
The ‘core’ interview sample included twenty-eight doc-
tors in H1 and P1 with more than one job of one type or
another - predominantly RWOPS. The majority of respon-
dents were specialists (n = 20/28) or specialists in training
(n = 7/28), known as ‘registrars’. This reflected the fact
that among doctors it was mostly specialists who under-
took RWOPS in and around H1 (as confirmed by key in-
formants): in fact, only specialists were allowed to. The
core sample was located by inviting participants through
departmental e-mail lists, and through a snowballing ap-
proach. Interviewing ceased once ‘saturation point’ was
reached, that is once no new major codes were arrived at
after three consecutive interviews [41].
Respondents were first asked open ended questions:
‘Can you tell me about your experience of holding more
than one job?’, and, ‘What are your feelings about having
more than one job?’ before probing further on hunches.
Follow-up interviews asked respondents directly whether
and how dual practice was understood to affect reten-
tion. The 51 total interviews with the core sample were
recorded and transcribed to retain ‘thick’ context in the
data [42]. Five respondents were not available for follow-
up interviews, three of whom noted they were too busy
and two of whom were not contactable.
Interviews were spread across six departments within
the two hospitals (alphabetically: anaesthesiology, medi-
cine, neonatology, obstetrics and gynaecology, psychiatry,
and surgery). Respondents’ ages ranged from 29 to 63, and
36% (10/28) of respondents were women. Although only
11% (3/28) of respondents were black, this reflected a ten-
dency for dual practice doctors working in the urban hos-
pital in question to be specialists, and for specialists in
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South Africa to be white [43]. Repeated, unsuccessful at-
tempts were made to track down further black respon-
dents including through snowballing (asking respondents
if they know of other, sought-after respondents).
Analysis was performed through ‘memoing’ (inductively
building up broad, explanatory hypotheses as interviews
progressed), and later collating these memos to derive cod-
ing categories. Coding was performed in Microsoft OneNote
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA) using its categorization
capabilities and through building ‘hyperlink’ lists linking to
relevant paragraphs of transcribed data. There was a back-
and-forth learning process used to validate data - for ex-
ample, where contradictory answers were given by different
respondents, reference would be made to policy documents
where understanding of policies conflicted. Key informant
interviews also helped to triangulate answers. Questions
during follow-up interviews also probed into what prior re-
spondents had said and how different individuals interpreted
certain points of view.
Results
Additional file 1 summarizes the hierarchy of hospital-based
doctors in South Africa for those unfamiliar with the con-
text. In practice, the private work undertaken by specialists
in South Africa is often undertaken in private wards estab-
lished in the public sector [44]. Interview respondents also
sometimes had their own private rooms, meaning an estab-
lished private practice; or covered other specialists on pri-
vate locums, the latter generally implying temporary private
work. Some specialties were noted to be more profitable in
terms of dual practice, and dual practice appeared popular
in these disciplines. In particular, surgery and anaesthesi-
ology were said to pay very well in the private sector.
RWOPS policy is subject to provincial government in-
terpretation. RWOPS was viewed by policy-makers inter-
viewed at provincial level as a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right’,
meaning it could be withdrawn at any point. Around the
time of fieldwork, in fact, RWOPS was entirely banned in
another of South Africa’s nine provinces.
To apply for RWOPS where fieldwork was conducted,
individuals had to justify how their practice was benefi-
cial to the government and how they would spend their
time on a weekly basis. Seven respondents interviewed
had never applied for RWOPS permission. H1’s hospital
CEO and other key informants noted that in spite of
RWOPS policy allowing for asset seizure and prosecu-
tion for fraud if RWOPS was not applied for or public
sector duties were neglected, respectively, these threats
had never have been carried out in H1 (see Additional
file 2 for details on the specifics of RWOPS policy at the
time of fieldwork).
Oversight of dual practice varied by department in H1.
One department actively encouraged RWOPS through an
on-site private wing in the public hospital, saying everyone
needed to ‘chip in’, and regularly checked rotors for devi-
ation. Revenues from this private work were shared equally
among the specialists in the department. Another depart-
ment banned RWOPS outright, though several came for-
ward in this department who undertook private work
without permission. A third department took a very laissez-
faire approach, where two respondents were interviewed
who appeared to fall under legal definitions of fraud. In
terms of locum work, which was relatively rare for special-
ists interviewed, a private sector administrator was inter-
viewed who admitted to actively recruiting registrars who
are not allowed to undertake dual practice at all since they
are still in training. Some respondents noted that some
medical officers (more junior doctors) also undertake lo-
cums regularly though this is not allowed in H1. No such
medical officers came forward for interview after repeated
invitations, though some specialists said they previously
undertook locums when they were Medical Officers.
Positive impacts of dual practice on intention to stay
Qualitative interviews indicated dual practice could posi-
tively affect intention to stay in the public sector for some
specialists by increasing job satisfaction. In interviews, dual
practice was generally perceived as an inherently satisfying
endeavor for those who chose to undertake it, explaining
both why it was sustained over time, and why it can in-
crease intention to stay in the public sector. Ashmore [26]
previously presented a variety of financial and non-financial
factors that dual practice specialists valued in their public
and private jobs. These factors included, for example, that a
number of specialists enjoyed balancing the better wages,
greater autonomy, and higher resource availability in the
private sector, with the collegiality, greater variety of teach-
ing and research work, and more complex pathology in the
public sector [26].
Additional interview evidence further demonstrates
that dual practice respondents explicitly drew the link
themselves, between holding multiple jobs, job satisfac-
tion, and intention to stay in the public sector:
Ja, I think overall it’s (RWOPS) probably the thing
that keeps me in my government job actually, because
with my skills and my training I don’t feel I get paid
what I should get paid, but I enjoy working here (in
H1), so that’s the most important thing for me … I
think with the combination of private work and
(public work) … I’m able to supplement my income,
so it’s quite a good income now and getting towards a
competitive income compared with if I was to work in
private. (H1 DP17, Interview 1)
And I think obviously the other thing that is central to
the private practice thing is that you’re likely to make
more money out of it … Which is the core aspect of
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why I do it, and why pretty much everybody else does it
… because it makes your salary a little bit more
competitive with what your alternatives are somewhere
else. (H1 DP7, Interview 1)
Ja, I think … (RWOPS) does (help retain me) because
you get frustrated if you feel you don’t get enough
operating time (in public), you don’t get enough time to
do (specific surgical procedures) and you can’t … see how
you’re going to make it work for you. For me I think it
(RWOPS) is a positive experience. (H1 DP14, Interview 2)
The first two extracts above speak to financial job satis-
faction factors associated with dual practice that can be
retention-enhancing, while the third speaks to a non-
financial job satisfaction factor having a similar effect. The
majority also agreed in follow-up interviews that they sim-
ply enjoy RWOPS, ‘otherwise I wouldn’t do it’, implying
self-selection into dual practice job arrangements.
However, these data suggest that the concept of job sat-
isfaction must itself be adjusted here to one of ‘work satis-
faction’, meaning satisfaction in one or more jobs. This is
since, in interviews, satisfaction seemed to change across
multiple jobs as a result of dual practice, not just in one
job. Work satisfaction seemed to spill over from one job
to the next as a result of dual practice since public and
private jobs offered unique incentives that led to jobs be-
ing complementary rather than substitutable. For example,
several respondents noted they were able to keep their
‘hand in’ through RWOPS, meaning they were able to per-
form procedures in the private sector that only more jun-
ior doctors performed in public.
Not all specialists interviewed felt dual practice was en-
tirely satisfying, however. Some highlighted opportunity
costs or tradeoffs to the practice, through having less free
time with friends and family and for other activities like
exercise. This led to ‘strained personal relationships’ and
compromised ‘work-life balance’:
… (overall satisfaction) increases (through RWOPS)
because you get paid more which means you can
afford nicer things I guess, and it increases because
you enjoy the work component of your life more; but
it decreases because you spend less time with your
kids and you’re overworked. (H1 DP16, Interview 2)
This implies that while dual practice may tend to increase
work satisfaction, it may by the same token decrease life sat-
isfaction, that is satisfaction with life outside work. Overall,
it appeared as if such opportunity costs were worthwhile,
since specialists generally noted they would otherwise not
be willing to continue with their multiple jobs. During
follow-up interviews, all specialists noted either a positive or
equivocal response when asked whether they felt dual
practice was satisfying, overall, for work and life outside
work. Some respondents noted their penchant for workahol-
ism. A registrar explained this by saying, ‘doctors are funny
… we always have this thing of proving ourselves … you try
and test yourself in different situations to see whether you
can cope with them'. Another respondent noted their per-
sonal work ethic boiled down to the phrase, ‘I work like hell’.
Negative or equivocal impacts of dual practice on
retention
This implies that even if dual practice is understood as satis-
fying overall, it may not prove sustainable in the long-run.
Many in H1 noted they were extremely overworked, and
that their extra job exacerbated this problem. The following
private specialist, located in P1, explained that they had pre-
viously opted to leave H1, for full-time private work, after
the dual practice arrangement proved too much to handle:
… I was working as a full-time consultant (in H1), and I
was doing limited private work at (a private hospital) …
and I was involved in teaching … I was doing three jobs. I
was trying to supplement my income and provide a ser-
vice to private patients. I was fulfilling my … commit-
ments to service delivery and then trying to have an
academic career … and that just wasn’t possible …
(P1 DP3, Interview 1)
In this regard, dual practice appeared capable of expedit-
ing a decision on whether to stay in the public sector or not,
bringing some respondents to a point where they felt ‘forced
to choose’ between their public and private jobs. While the
above respondent sided with the private sector, the following
respondent chose to only work in the public sector after
feeling overwhelmed by dual practice:
I decided at 0200 h one morning when I was doing a
difficult (case) that I actually couldn’t keep all the balls in
the air. And on one hand it was very nice earning extra
money (through dual practice) - it just gives you that little
more flexibility and one would be a liar to say it doesn’t;
but on the other hand you also need to know what your
priority is. And you know, I’ve got academic aspirations.
(H1 DP15, Interview 1)
It was also noted that how specialists compared public
and private jobs could change as a result of dual practice.
This could also undermine intention to stay in the public
sector. For example, the following respondent explained that
although their work satisfaction increased through dual prac-
tice, their satisfaction with the public sector decreased, after
they became frustrated with poorly functioning services:
… private work doesn’t add to public satisfaction. In
fact it detracts a little bit because you get a bit
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frustrated with how things work in public. (H1 DP18,
Interview 2)
Yet not all respondents felt this way. Others explained
their private jobs made them more appreciative of the
public sector, as with the following junior specialist:
Doing private locums makes me more want to stay in
public sector … Sure you earn maybe … four or five
times what you’re earning in the state, but I’m not
sure it’s worth it. You stress, you have people phoning
you all the time. It’s heavy, it’s the heaviest
responsibility … (H1 DP18, Interview 1)
More worryingly, from a public sector retention per-
spective, interview respondents also mentioned dual prac-
tice could reduce migration costs to the private sector,
thus facilitating public specialists moving to the private
sector. Respondents noted, in particular, that the first few
years of private practice could be relatively unprofitable,
since ‘you spend a lot of time sitting in your office hoping
that somebody is going to knock on the door’. Dual prac-
tice could help build access to a steady patient pool
through referral networks of General Practitioners (GPs)
prior to leaving the public sector. As several respondents
agreed, this allowed specialists to use dual practice and
RWOPS as a ‘stepping stone’ and to ‘launch careers’ in the
private sector:
I think definitely people (use RWOPS to launch
private careers) … I mean they have a salary here
(in H1), and they need to build up a practice; and if
you just go ‘out there’ (into private) immediately they
have costs and things, so they tend to do RWOPS.
(H1 DP2, Interview 2).
Initial cost outlays for private practice included building
referral networks, as mentioned, but also other sunk costs
including buying particular machinery, such as ultrasound
machinery, and emotional costs associated with getting to
know a new place, new people, and a new system. Not all
specialists seemed to face all these problems, however. Some
mentioned being invited to take over or join already existing
practices.
In interviews, no respondents admitted to using dual
practice as a 'stepping stone' explicitly (and it was felt in-
appropriate to directly press this question), but a number of
individuals did mention others for whom they believed this
to have been the case.
Revised conceptual framework
Thus, it seems that dual practice provides both incen-
tives to stay in the public sector, through increased over-
all work and life satisfaction (or ‘work-life satisfaction’),
and incentives to move to the private sector, through re-
duced migration costs or ‘stepping stone’ effects. In par-
ticular, it was found that dual practice allowed specialists
to build up GP referral networks while maintaining a
full-time government wage, making moving permanently
to the private sector less costly in the short-term than if
they were to do so immediately. Additional insights not
previously found in the literature include that dual prac-
tice may also affect retention by proving unsustainable
through overworking, forcing a decisions on whether to
stay in the public sector or ‘go private’ that might other-
wise seem less imminent. Dual practice may also change
the way public and private jobs are compared with one
another, in terms of either feeling more frustrated with
the public sector having seen how people work in pri-
vate, or vice versa.
This summary of conceptual channels between dual
practice and intention to stay is depicted in Figure 1
below. The conceptual framework, similarly to Franco
et al.’s [30] motivational framework in a health care con-
text, assumes contextual factors (sociocultural, policy and
personal, factors) filter down to the individual level,
informing the particular context of dual practice in a spe-
cific setting. Such contextual factors are evident above in
the particularities of, for example, individuals who were
strongly encouraged to undertake dual practice by their
own department (versus those not allowed to in another
department) which may affect whether the practice is
enjoyed and sustained. The importance of personal factors
is also evident in the extracts from interviews with respon-
dents H1 DP15 and P1 DP3 above. After feeling highly
overworked, these two respondents chose to drop their
private and public sector jobs, respectively, due to per-
sonal values held. Such contextual factors undoubtedly
play a strong role in determining the dynamics surround-
ing whether dual practice helps or does not help to retain
specialists in a specific setting.
In Figure 1, positive and negative channels for reten-
tion (or rather, intention to stay) are expressed with +
and − signs. It is also important to note that the figure
draws a connection between overworking and work-life
satisfaction, as well as an interaction between changes in
how jobs are compared and work-life satisfaction. The
latter is since working in a second job may increase or
decrease satisfaction in a primary job, while overworking
appeared to cause general frustration.
Finally, it is important to discuss the issue of
organizational loyalty. In the figure above, loyalty medi-
ates all incentives to leave the public sector, but is not
affected by dual practice. This is since, in follow-up in-
terviews, respondents’ answers converged in terms of
noting that their loyalties to the public sector were es-
sentially formed earlier on in their careers; for example,
through the influence of experiences in rural settings
Ashmore and Gilson Human Resources for Health 2015, 13:3 Page 6 of 9
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/13/1/3
after graduating and through the influence of role models.
Loyalty was generally noted to relate to public sector pa-
tients and colleagues, as well as to the work itself and per-
sonal or professional values, but infrequently to the public
sector administration or Department of Health:
My loyalty is not to the province (provincial government),
it’s loyalty to my own value system. For a lot of us it lies
in serving the communities that need us most, and that
really has nothing to do with the state who doesn’t serve
them very well. It’s really in spite of the state, not because
of them, that we work. (H1 DP6, Interview 2)
I think the most important thing is to create the right
perception amongst your colleagues. To always make
sure the conflict (between jobs) is kept to a minimum,
and if there is going to be conflict that you default always
towards your government work because that’s where your
commitment should be. (H1 DP17, Interview 1)
While loyalty appeared predetermined, it nevertheless
may be very important as a mediator to low work satis-
faction, given some specialists continued to work in the
public sector despite significant frustrations. Loyalty also
appeared to mediate incentives to leave the public sector
where dual practice arrangements became unsustainable
through overworking, as in the figure above, in cases
where private sectors jobs were dropped in favour of
public sector jobs.
Loyalty also mediated incentives to use dual practice as
a 'stepping stone' into private practice, given these incen-
tives were often present but not always acted upon. While
some individuals in H1 felt they were keeping their ‘op-
tions open’ through dual practice, others used the practice
specifically as a means to stay in public practice.
Discussion
The results and framework above elaborate both positive
and negative channels of influence between dual practice
and intention to stay in the public sector. The existence of
these different channels implies the relationship between
dual practice and retention is complex and context-
dependent. Context dependency is implied in that different
policy environments will likely provide different incentives
to health workers, and allow different opportunities in pub-
lic and private sectors. Even within the same country it is
likely that dual practice will in different settings sometimes
have positive, and sometimes negative, net impacts on
retention.
In the research setting, the fact that many individuals
found public sector hospital work and pathologies inter-
esting may be one of the contextual reasons many were
Figure 1 Revised conceptualization of the relationship between dual practice and intention to stay in the public sector.
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willing to stay on in the public sector. Where health workers
are less academically inclined, or less inclined towards work-
aholism, this finding may differ. In addition, other contexts
will not have on-site private sector work available to them,
which may imply greater likelihood of individuals seeking
dual practice in fully private hospitals. This may in fact be
expected to increase the ‘stepping stone’ effects associated
with building up a GP referral base, which could undermine
retention in the public sector further.
The study was limited by only speaking to intention to
stay, rather than observed retention behaviour, though
as noted the two tend to correlate well. The specific con-
text of the study also means additional conceptual in-
sights might be found elsewhere, though overlapping
themes would be expected and the conceptual frame-
work may well be relevant beyond this South African
hospital setting. The fact that the majority of specialists
in this study were white and from a relatively limited
cultural background also implies that additional chan-
nels of influence between dual practice and retention
could be found in future studies.
Overall, some specialists appear to use dual practice as a
means to stay in the public sector, through higher work-
life satisfaction, in spite of opportunity costs to dual prac-
tice; others appear to feel dual practice is unsustainable
over the long-run. Dual practice may also change how
public and private job options are compared, and provide
incentives to exit the public sector through reduced mi-
gration costs. Some of these channels of influence be-
tween dual practice and intention to stay were expected
from the literature, though to these authors’ knowledge
this paper represents the first structured conceptual
inquiry into this area. Organizational loyalty was found to
be an important contextual mediator to incentives to leave
the public sector, and was found to be determined early
on in doctors’ careers.
South African policy-makers should take note that
RWOPS may not be working in the interests of boosting
public sector retention, at least for specialists, and that the
policy could well be failing in its aims. Importantly, however,
this is not to say that banning RWOPS would necessarily be
beneficial, since it is clear from other countries’ experiences
[9], and from discussions during interviews in H1 and P1,
that banning dual practice may well backfire. This is since
specialists tend to view a ban on dual practice as threaten-
ing, and since dual practice often persists when banned
[9,45]. There are also other impacts of dual practice which
this paper did not evaluate, such as absenteeism, which may
be equally important to factor into an evaluation of dual
practice costs and benefits.
As such, it seems that the primary lesson from this
paper is that it is questionable whether dual practice in-
creases retention in the public sector, and that banning
the practice may be more questionable than strengthening
accountability mechanisms such as careful roster monitor-
ing. This may be particularly the case in surgery and an-
aesthesiology, for example, where roster systems are based
around theatre times and where many undertake dual
practice. It may also be beneficial to consider strengthen-
ing internal whistleblower mechanisms and how informa-
tion about dual practice abuse is acted upon, given
nobody in H1 had received any punishment for RWOPS
abuses in spite of several clear examples.
Other studies may wish to quantitatively test the rela-
tionship between dual practice and retention by drawing
on this conceptual framework, and to investigate whether
the framework applies beyond the context of specialists
and to other cadres of health workers. Health policy and
systems research could learn from this study in terms of
similarly using qualitative research to explore conceptual
relationships in highly understudied areas.
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